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hardened_malloc
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override local default to -fstack-protector-strong 

This is a no-op on a toolchain compiled with the basic mitigations
enabled by default, so this is generally a no-op anywhere this project
is likely to be deployed. SSP has a very low performance cost so there's
little reason to avoid it, even though it also has zero value for this
code in practice. It would be great if one of the more modern approaches
was widely adopted, but unfortunately SSP is as good as it gets for
portable options. It doesn't provide any protection against external
writes to the stack data which is all that's really needed here.

ShadowCallStack is a great option for arm64, but it's substantially more
difficult to protect return addresses well on x86_64 due to the design of
the ISA and ABI.
pull/87/head
Daniel Micay 2019-07-19 11:23:44 -04:00
parent 77743e5a36
commit 90d12fb340
1 changed files with 1 additions and 1 deletions
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Makefile
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@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ $(shell $(CC) -E $1 - </dev/null >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo $1 || echo $2)
endef
CPPFLAGS := -D_GNU_SOURCE
SHARED_FLAGS := -O3 -flto -fPIC -fvisibility=hidden $(call safe_flag,-fno-plt) $(call safe_flag,-fstack-clash-protection) -pipe -Wall -Wextra $(call safe_flag,-Wcast-align=strict) -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings
SHARED_FLAGS := -O3 -flto -fPIC -fvisibility=hidden $(call safe_flag,-fno-plt) $(call safe_flag,-fstack-clash-protection) -fstack-protector-strong -pipe -Wall -Wextra $(call safe_flag,-Wcast-align=strict) -Wcast-qual -Wwrite-strings
ifeq ($(CONFIG_NATIVE),true)
SHARED_FLAGS += -march=native