Commit Graph

95 Commits (0bf18b7c266e7c1ee05f64916ac5c3aada2b0936)

Author SHA1 Message Date
Daniel Micay 0bf18b7c26 optimize malloc_usable_size enforce_init 2020-10-03 15:10:49 -04:00
Daniel Micay 178d4f320f harden checks for uninitialized usage 2020-10-02 15:06:29 -04:00
Daniel Micay 483b1d7b8b empty malloc_info output when stats are disabled 2020-09-17 17:42:18 -04:00
Daniel Micay 96eca21ac5 remove thread_local macro workaround glibc < 2.28 2020-09-17 17:38:40 -04:00
Daniel Micay b4bbd09f07 change label for quarantined large allocations 2020-09-17 16:56:01 -04:00
Daniel Micay a88305c01b support disabling region quarantine 2020-09-17 16:53:34 -04:00
Daniel Micay 85c5c3736c add stats tracking to special large realloc paths 2020-09-17 16:29:13 -04:00
Daniel Micay 96a9bcf3a1 move deprecated glibc extensions to the bottom 2020-09-17 16:20:05 -04:00
Daniel Micay 41fb89517a simplify malloc_info code 2020-09-17 16:10:02 -04:00
Daniel Micay 50e0f1334c add is_init check to malloc_info 2020-09-17 16:07:10 -04:00
Daniel Micay 9fb2791af2 add is_init check to h_mallinfo_arena_info 2020-09-17 16:00:03 -04:00
anupritaisno1 8974af86d1 hardened malloc: iterate -> malloc_iterate
Signed-off-by: anupritaisno1 <www.anuprita804@gmail.com>
2020-09-15 00:37:23 -04:00
Daniel Micay dd7291ebfe better wording for page size mismatch error 2020-08-05 18:10:53 -04:00
Daniel Micay bcb93cab63 avoid an ifdef 2020-08-04 17:22:03 -04:00
rwarr627 f214bd541a added check for if small allocations are free 2020-06-17 23:29:30 -04:00
Daniel Micay 722974f4e9 remove trailing whitespace 2020-06-13 09:59:50 -04:00
rwarr627 577524798e calculates offset from start for small allocations 2020-06-13 01:27:32 -04:00
Daniel Micay 467ba8440f add comment explaining slab cache size 2020-05-24 09:36:43 -04:00
Daniel Micay 067b3c864f set slab cache sizes based on the largest slab 2020-05-24 09:31:02 -04:00
Daniel Micay 4a6bbe445c limit cached slabs based on max size class 2020-05-13 01:05:37 -04:00
Daniel Micay b672316bc7 use const for memory_corruption_check_small
This currently causes a warning (treated as an error) on Android where
malloc_usable_size uses a const pointer.
2020-04-30 16:06:32 -04:00
Daniel Micay 029a2edf28 remove trailing whitespace 2020-04-30 16:03:45 -04:00
rwarr627 35bd7cd76d added memory corruption checking to malloc_usable_size for slab allocations 2020-04-29 18:06:15 -04:00
Daniel Micay 19365c25d6 remove workaround for Linux kernel MPK fork bug 2020-04-24 02:51:39 -04:00
Daniel Micay 0436227092 no longer need glibc pthread_atfork workaround 2020-03-29 11:40:12 -04:00
Daniel Micay 449962e044 disable obsolete glibc extensions elsewhere 2020-02-03 08:39:19 -05:00
Daniel Micay a28da3c65a use prefix for extended mallinfo functions 2019-09-07 18:33:24 -04:00
Daniel Micay d37657e125 enable llvm-include-order tidy check 2019-08-18 02:39:55 -04:00
Daniel Micay d80919fa1e substantially raise the arbitrary arena limit 2019-07-12 03:43:33 -04:00
Daniel Micay 410e9efb93 extend configuration sanity checks 2019-07-11 17:09:48 -04:00
Daniel Micay a32e26b8e9 avoid trying to use mremap outside of Linux 2019-07-05 21:59:44 -04:00
Daniel Micay bc75c4db7b realloc: use copy_size to check for canaries
This avoids unnecessarily copying the canary when doing a realloc from a
small size to a large size. It also avoids trying to copy a non-existent
canary out of a zero-size allocation, which are memory protected.
2019-06-17 00:28:10 -04:00
Daniel Micay 12525f2861 work around old glibc releases without threads.h 2019-06-06 08:10:57 -04:00
Daniel Micay 409a639312 provide working malloc_info outside Android too 2019-04-19 16:56:07 -04:00
Daniel Micay 494436c904 implement options handling for malloc_info 2019-04-19 16:23:14 -04:00
Daniel Micay a13db3fc68 initialize size class CSPRNGs from init CSPRNG
This avoids making a huge number of getrandom system calls during
initialization. The init CSPRNG is unmapped before initialization
finishes and these are still reseeded from the OS. The purpose of the
independent CSPRNGs is simply to avoid the massive performance hit of
synchronization and there's no harm in doing it this way.

Keeping around the init CSPRNG and reseeding from it would defeat the
purpose of reseeding, and it isn't a measurable performance issue since
it can just be tuned to reseed less often.
2019-04-15 06:50:24 -04:00
Daniel Micay f115be8392 shrink initial region table size to fit in 1 page 2019-04-15 00:04:00 -04:00
Daniel Micay e7eeb3f35c avoid reading thread_local more than once 2019-04-14 20:26:14 -04:00
Daniel Micay 7e465c621e use allocate_large directly in large remap path 2019-04-14 19:46:22 -04:00
Daniel Micay 1c899657c1 add is_init check to mallinfo functions 2019-04-14 19:12:38 -04:00
Daniel Micay 8774065b13 fix non-init size for malloc_object_size extension 2019-04-14 19:01:25 -04:00
Daniel Micay 84a25ec83e fix build with CONFIG_STATS enabled 2019-04-11 00:51:34 -04:00
Daniel Micay d4b8fee1c4 allow using the largest slab allocation size 2019-04-10 16:54:58 -04:00
Daniel Micay 086eb1fee4 at a final spacing class of 1 slot size classes 2019-04-10 16:32:24 -04:00
Daniel Micay 7a89a7b8c5 support for slabs with 1 slot for largest sizes 2019-04-10 16:26:49 -04:00
Daniel Micay 6c31f6710a support extended range of small size classes 2019-04-10 08:31:51 -04:00
Daniel Micay d5f18c47b3 micro-optimize initialization with arenas 2019-04-10 08:07:24 -04:00
Daniel Micay 62c73d8b41 harden thread_arena check 2019-04-10 07:40:29 -04:00
Daniel Micay d5c00b4d0d disable current in-place growth code path for now 2019-04-09 19:20:34 -04:00
Daniel Micay d5c1bca915 use round-robin assignment to arenas
The initial implementation was a temporary hack rather than a serious
implementation of random arena selection. It may still make sense to
offer it but it should be implemented via the CSPRNG instead of this
silly hack. It would also make sense to offer dynamic load balancing,
particularly with sched_getcpu().

This results in a much more predictable spread across arenas. This is
one place where randomization probably isn't a great idea because it
makes the benefits of arenas unpredictable in programs not creating a
massive number of threads. The security benefits of randomization for
this are also quite small. It's not certain that randomization is even a
net win for security since it's not random enough and can result in a
more interesting mix of threads in the same arena for an attacker if
they're able to attempt multiple attacks.
2019-04-09 16:54:14 -04:00