Daniel Micay
0bf18b7c26
optimize malloc_usable_size enforce_init
2020-10-03 15:10:49 -04:00
Daniel Micay
178d4f320f
harden checks for uninitialized usage
2020-10-02 15:06:29 -04:00
Daniel Micay
483b1d7b8b
empty malloc_info output when stats are disabled
2020-09-17 17:42:18 -04:00
Daniel Micay
96eca21ac5
remove thread_local macro workaround glibc < 2.28
2020-09-17 17:38:40 -04:00
Daniel Micay
b4bbd09f07
change label for quarantined large allocations
2020-09-17 16:56:01 -04:00
Daniel Micay
a88305c01b
support disabling region quarantine
2020-09-17 16:53:34 -04:00
Daniel Micay
85c5c3736c
add stats tracking to special large realloc paths
2020-09-17 16:29:13 -04:00
Daniel Micay
96a9bcf3a1
move deprecated glibc extensions to the bottom
2020-09-17 16:20:05 -04:00
Daniel Micay
41fb89517a
simplify malloc_info code
2020-09-17 16:10:02 -04:00
Daniel Micay
50e0f1334c
add is_init check to malloc_info
2020-09-17 16:07:10 -04:00
Daniel Micay
9fb2791af2
add is_init check to h_mallinfo_arena_info
2020-09-17 16:00:03 -04:00
anupritaisno1
8974af86d1
hardened malloc: iterate -> malloc_iterate
...
Signed-off-by: anupritaisno1 <www.anuprita804@gmail.com>
2020-09-15 00:37:23 -04:00
Daniel Micay
dd7291ebfe
better wording for page size mismatch error
2020-08-05 18:10:53 -04:00
Daniel Micay
bcb93cab63
avoid an ifdef
2020-08-04 17:22:03 -04:00
rwarr627
f214bd541a
added check for if small allocations are free
2020-06-17 23:29:30 -04:00
Daniel Micay
722974f4e9
remove trailing whitespace
2020-06-13 09:59:50 -04:00
rwarr627
577524798e
calculates offset from start for small allocations
2020-06-13 01:27:32 -04:00
Daniel Micay
467ba8440f
add comment explaining slab cache size
2020-05-24 09:36:43 -04:00
Daniel Micay
067b3c864f
set slab cache sizes based on the largest slab
2020-05-24 09:31:02 -04:00
Daniel Micay
4a6bbe445c
limit cached slabs based on max size class
2020-05-13 01:05:37 -04:00
Daniel Micay
b672316bc7
use const for memory_corruption_check_small
...
This currently causes a warning (treated as an error) on Android where
malloc_usable_size uses a const pointer.
2020-04-30 16:06:32 -04:00
Daniel Micay
029a2edf28
remove trailing whitespace
2020-04-30 16:03:45 -04:00
rwarr627
35bd7cd76d
added memory corruption checking to malloc_usable_size for slab allocations
2020-04-29 18:06:15 -04:00
Daniel Micay
19365c25d6
remove workaround for Linux kernel MPK fork bug
2020-04-24 02:51:39 -04:00
Daniel Micay
0436227092
no longer need glibc pthread_atfork workaround
2020-03-29 11:40:12 -04:00
Daniel Micay
449962e044
disable obsolete glibc extensions elsewhere
2020-02-03 08:39:19 -05:00
Daniel Micay
a28da3c65a
use prefix for extended mallinfo functions
2019-09-07 18:33:24 -04:00
Daniel Micay
d37657e125
enable llvm-include-order tidy check
2019-08-18 02:39:55 -04:00
Daniel Micay
d80919fa1e
substantially raise the arbitrary arena limit
2019-07-12 03:43:33 -04:00
Daniel Micay
410e9efb93
extend configuration sanity checks
2019-07-11 17:09:48 -04:00
Daniel Micay
a32e26b8e9
avoid trying to use mremap outside of Linux
2019-07-05 21:59:44 -04:00
Daniel Micay
bc75c4db7b
realloc: use copy_size to check for canaries
...
This avoids unnecessarily copying the canary when doing a realloc from a
small size to a large size. It also avoids trying to copy a non-existent
canary out of a zero-size allocation, which are memory protected.
2019-06-17 00:28:10 -04:00
Daniel Micay
12525f2861
work around old glibc releases without threads.h
2019-06-06 08:10:57 -04:00
Daniel Micay
409a639312
provide working malloc_info outside Android too
2019-04-19 16:56:07 -04:00
Daniel Micay
494436c904
implement options handling for malloc_info
2019-04-19 16:23:14 -04:00
Daniel Micay
a13db3fc68
initialize size class CSPRNGs from init CSPRNG
...
This avoids making a huge number of getrandom system calls during
initialization. The init CSPRNG is unmapped before initialization
finishes and these are still reseeded from the OS. The purpose of the
independent CSPRNGs is simply to avoid the massive performance hit of
synchronization and there's no harm in doing it this way.
Keeping around the init CSPRNG and reseeding from it would defeat the
purpose of reseeding, and it isn't a measurable performance issue since
it can just be tuned to reseed less often.
2019-04-15 06:50:24 -04:00
Daniel Micay
f115be8392
shrink initial region table size to fit in 1 page
2019-04-15 00:04:00 -04:00
Daniel Micay
e7eeb3f35c
avoid reading thread_local more than once
2019-04-14 20:26:14 -04:00
Daniel Micay
7e465c621e
use allocate_large directly in large remap path
2019-04-14 19:46:22 -04:00
Daniel Micay
1c899657c1
add is_init check to mallinfo functions
2019-04-14 19:12:38 -04:00
Daniel Micay
8774065b13
fix non-init size for malloc_object_size extension
2019-04-14 19:01:25 -04:00
Daniel Micay
84a25ec83e
fix build with CONFIG_STATS enabled
2019-04-11 00:51:34 -04:00
Daniel Micay
d4b8fee1c4
allow using the largest slab allocation size
2019-04-10 16:54:58 -04:00
Daniel Micay
086eb1fee4
at a final spacing class of 1 slot size classes
2019-04-10 16:32:24 -04:00
Daniel Micay
7a89a7b8c5
support for slabs with 1 slot for largest sizes
2019-04-10 16:26:49 -04:00
Daniel Micay
6c31f6710a
support extended range of small size classes
2019-04-10 08:31:51 -04:00
Daniel Micay
d5f18c47b3
micro-optimize initialization with arenas
2019-04-10 08:07:24 -04:00
Daniel Micay
62c73d8b41
harden thread_arena check
2019-04-10 07:40:29 -04:00
Daniel Micay
d5c00b4d0d
disable current in-place growth code path for now
2019-04-09 19:20:34 -04:00
Daniel Micay
d5c1bca915
use round-robin assignment to arenas
...
The initial implementation was a temporary hack rather than a serious
implementation of random arena selection. It may still make sense to
offer it but it should be implemented via the CSPRNG instead of this
silly hack. It would also make sense to offer dynamic load balancing,
particularly with sched_getcpu().
This results in a much more predictable spread across arenas. This is
one place where randomization probably isn't a great idea because it
makes the benefits of arenas unpredictable in programs not creating a
massive number of threads. The security benefits of randomization for
this are also quite small. It's not certain that randomization is even a
net win for security since it's not random enough and can result in a
more interesting mix of threads in the same arena for an attacker if
they're able to attempt multiple attacks.
2019-04-09 16:54:14 -04:00